Tag Archives: Arctic methane

Ecological realism in climate change investment

Awareness by podcast

My 7 December 2023 interview on The Why? Curve podcast aimed to raise awareness of the need for smarter investment in climate change mitigation to prevent major Earth systems breaking down in the 2050s or 2060s. Worse, there are reasons to think that the loss of Arctic summer sea ice from around 2030 could accelerate this process dramatically. These risks are so obvious and dire that they call for urgent precautionary action.

Cascades of chaos

Major Earth systems are becoming unstable under stress from global heating and other more direct pressures. These systems include the Arctic Ocean and its surrounding coasts and permafrosts, the Amazon and other rainforests, and major ocean currents and monsoons. They have been absorbing stresses for decades but are now approaching the limits of their tolerance. That limit is each system’s tipping point, when it becomes committed to chaotic transformation. Because Earth systems are connected they can pull each other over, so multiple systems could become committed to breaking down at about the same time. This would be a ‘biosphere-wide tipping point‘ (BTP), which is a key moment because we can influence outcomes until it is reached, but we will be powerless to do so afterwards.

Deadline awareness

Time for a re-think

The idea of a BTP challenges all our assumptions about the future. These were shaped during centuries of economic expansion into what was seen as an infinite global frontier. But our predicament now, at the end of that phase, leads us towards the idea of deadline-aware mitigation investment (DAMI) with a new purpose and a new approach.

  • The new purpose would be to postpone the BTP, thus buying ourselves time to strengthen our societies against climate chaos, decarbonise our economies, recapture GHGs from the air, and restore peace with nature.
  • The new approach would be to refocus investments on those that are proven to reduce net GHG emissions soonest and most cost-effectively, while remaining true to our other values.

Postponing the BTP

I have proposed and demonstrated a transparent and consistent way to calculate the cost-effectiveness of different mitigation investments in postponing the BTP. This relies on:

  • assuming a realistic date for the BTP;
  • calculating the amount and timing of net GHG emission savings from each mitigation investment up to that date (in tCO2e);
  • valuing those savings exponentially more highly the sooner they are delivered relative to that date, to give us the ‘dated mitigation value’ of each investment (in tCO2edmv); and
  • estimating true mitigation cost-effectiveness from the cost of the project over the same period (in tCO2edmv/£).

DAMI useful

Armed with data on true mitigation cost-effectiveness, public servants can reliably choose the best public investments. This would improve governments’ ability to deliver on their ‘net zero’ or Paris Agreement goals. Taxes and other regulatory signals can also be adjusted to ensure that the most cost-effective mitigation projects attract the highest rates of financial return for private investors, while also valuing healthy ecosystems, biodiversity, human rights and other important co-benefits.

The Arctic threat

Summer sea ice decline

The progressive thinning and shrinking of Arctic Ocean sea ice since 1979 was first flagged by Peter Wadhams, former Director of the Scott Polar Research Institute, in his 2016 book A Farewell to Ice. The volume of Arctic summer sea ice continued to decline and is now expected to approach zero at its September minimum by around 2030.

Heating oceans

The context for the Arctic issue is the rising heat of the oceans. This has increased by hundreds of zettajoules (ZJ) since the mid-1980s (one ZJ ≈ double humanity’s current energy use). This is where most greenhouse heat has been going, with much of the rest going into melting ice.

Step-change in Arctic heating

Without summer sea ice to absorb excess heat, at least two mechanisms mean that the temperature of the Arctic Ocean and its seabed and coastal zone will begin to rise much faster than before. These are:

  • that it takes 80 times less heat to warm water than to melt ice (4 J/g/C for water [due to its ‘heat capacity’] vs 334 J/g/C for ice [due to its ‘latent heat of fusion’]); and
  • that without white and reflective ice, more solar heat enters the ocean.

Potential methane consequences

The likely rate at which Arctic Ocean temperature will rise under ice-free summer conditions is unknown, but could be high. Until we know what will actually happen, a precautionary attitude is called for since sudden Arctic heating could have the following consequences:

  • a potentially large share of many hundreds of billions of tonnes (Gt) of peat contained within permafrosts throughout the Arctic will decay and release methane (CH4); and
  • a potentially large share of the hundreds of Gt of CH4 contained within frozen clathrates (or hydrates) in the Arctic seabed will be released.

Potential climate consequences

Every tonne of methane is about 86 times more potent as a GHG over 20 years (the most relevant timescale) than a tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2), so 1 Gt CH4 ≈ 86 GtCO2e, equivalent to about twice current global emissions of all GHGs put together. If there’s the slightest chance of this happening, urgent precautionary investment to mitigate harm would be justified. Since we cannot now prevent the loss of Arctic summer sea ice, this may have to involve open-air methane recapture. If we need to do this in the 2030s, we should start thinking about it now.

What is to be done?

As a contribution to safeguarding the process of urgent, fair and effective decarbonisation, my podcast aimed to raise awareness and encourage urgent, practical thought:

  • about the BTP deadline, to encourage greater cost-effectiveness in mitigation investment, so that everything we do contributes to postponing the BTP;
  • about the Arctic methane threat, to alert people to the need for precautionary action to make sure that we don’t sleep-walk into an early BTP; and
  • about both, to encourage anyone who can to spread the word, the sense of urgency, and the need for a new spirit of ecological realism in all our actions.

Julian Caldecott 2023

Fossil Fools Day, 2023

On this first day of April we celebrate foolishness. There is none greater than burning your own home because you like the pretty flames. It’s not even as clever as peeing in your pants to keep warm at the start of winter, as they say in the Nordic countries. So we throw more coal, peat, forests, petroleum and natural gas on the fire because it’s convenient right now. But the effects, as Al Gore and Greta Thunberg have pointed out, will be not just inconvenient but deadly.

Too many fires are making too much carbon dioxide too quickly. This traps the sun’s heat on Earth, warming the oceans and melting the ice of the poles. The Arctic is an ocean surrounded by land. In its bed are a trillion tonnes of frozen methane, which is already bubbling to the surface, and methane is much better at trapping heat than carbon dioxide. Moreover, in the frozen lands around about are another trillion tonnes of methane, held in frozen peat and organic soils. This is already leaking out as the ice lands melt and rot.

So what will happen when global heating pushes the Arctic beyond whatever tipping point keeps it in the deep freeze? Of course the answer is an immense pulse of methane. That’s the big show that could finish us off. Carbon dioxide is only the warm-up act. And when might that happen? All the signs suggest around the middle of this century. Are we ready for this, and do we even know what ‘being ready’ means? Are we even trying seriously to cut back on carbon dioxide emissions? We still churn out scores of billions of tonnes of the stuff every year, and save only a thousandth part of that. So the answers are: not yet!.

We seem inclined to keep putting things off. But with a mid-century deadline looming from the Arctic methane if nothing else, putting things off is really daft. Even if the sums are wrong and it’s really the 2080s rather than the 2050s when the Arctic methane hits the fan, that’s still not very long. We need to get a grip. And that means putting away the jester’s bladder and getting serious. So what to do instead of acting the Fossil Fool?

I could rattle off a list, but here are a couple. First, we should vote only for leaders who will tax carbon emissions radically and enable ferocious and fair investment in decarbonising our economies. And second, we should make sure that rewards from investment are highest when emissions are avoided soonest. With special merit points for those that also help protect and restore nature, and that promote human wellbeing and community solidarity. This would make working with local communities to prevent harm to all our remaining high carbon-density natural ecosystems the maximum top priority everywhere on Earth.

The simple fact in this emergency is that a tonne of emissions avoided now has much more survival value than a tonne of emissions avoided years from now. So that should be the starting point of all our policies, and it should shape all our efforts, incentives and disincentives. Any proposal to decarbonise anything should be met by the question: how much carbon saved how quickly? And be closely followed by another: and with what co-benefits?

These questions will lead not only to the best nature-based and community-based solutions, but to the best technological ones as well. The point is that every potential investment should be made to answer the same questions, so we can compare them. Talking up innovative and imaginative solutions is OK, but only if they are supported by evidence-based reasoning that lets us pick the most cost-effective ways to avoid global catastrophe. Survival value, precaution and co-benefits should be the watchwords. The time is over for Fossil Fool governments that fail to protect us, our children and the biosphere. No to more foolishness! Happy All-Fools Day.

© Julian Caldecott

Net Zero by 2050: notes on the Rothamsted Conference

The conference was convened on 20 September 2019 by Bim Afolami MP, with about 200 participants. They included half a dozen or so from the Extinction Rebellion (XR), with whom I had lively conversations about universal carbon rationing, the closure of national air spaces to jet aircraft, the creation of a high and stable price for carbon by non-market means (e.g. commitment to buy certified conserved carbon at a fixed price in the distant future), the supremacy of ecological over human laws, and the need for good leaders to explain the truth effectively. There were also a score or so of school children, who were there to learn about the issues driving the global School Strike for Climate[1]. In solidarity with the latter, I had with me an icon of Greta Thunberg, beautifully painted by my niece Florence.

The conference was opened by Bim Afolami, who welcomed the students, mentioned the School Strike, and stressed that the conference was to provide bottom-up thinking with which to inform Parliament. The first presentation was by Baroness Brown, Vice-Chair of the Climate Change Committee. She noted that the issue for the CCC – in line with international agreements – was with ‘territorial emissions’ (those internal to the country, so its own responsibility), not ‘consumption emissions’ (those imported as embedded carbon in goods produced elsewhere, so someone else’s responsibility). Considering only territorial emissions, then, the UK reduced its total from 800 MtCO2e in 1990 to 500 MtCO2e in 2016, almost entirely through measures of which the electorate were virtually unaware (i.e. decarbonisation of power supply, mainly from wind and phasing out coal). The 2008 goal of an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050 was initially thought to cost 1-2% of GDP, but renewables have become cheaper so the 2019 goal of zero emissions by 2050 is still estimated to cost 1-2% of GDP, but it may be less and will include large but unquantified benefits from clean growth, health and environment. For comparison, the banking crisis that began in 2008 is thought to have cost about 10% of GDP.

To bring UK emissions to zero will require[2]: a 2-4 fold increase in the size of the electricity sector (because of the need to electrify so many things, such as domestic heating and surface transport, and for hydrogen production); increased offshore wind from 10 to 75 GW/year; increased hydrogen production from 27 to 350 TWh/year; increased carbon capture and storage from zero to 180 MtCO2e/year All these can be done without the public much noticing, but also needed will be: forest planting increased from 10 to 50 thousand hectares (requiring land use changes); insulation and renewable heating for 29 million homes (requiring domestic investment); zero registration of new fossil-fuel powered vehicles; up to a 25% reduction in flying; and changes in employment and skills. These require a mixture of societal and technical changes, and the development of what Greta Thunberg has called ‘cathedral thinking’.[3]

The keynote address was by Ben Caldecott, who was introduced by Bim Afolami as founder-director of the Sustainable Finance Programme of Oxford University, formerly of the Green Alliance and Climate Change Capital, and as one “who has been praised by so many diverse newspapers that he has a public profile that any politician would die for”. Ben said that his talk and his institution’s research programme was about stranded assets and their implications: the two-way relationship between investors and society, including environment-related risks that create stranded assets, and the role of the Bank of England. He began by observing that Joseph Schumpeter had introduced the idea of ‘creative destruction’ as a feature of capitalist economic systems[4], and that Carlota Perez had described the shifting of techno-economic paradigms (TEPs)[5]. Ben argued that the drivers of the current TEP shift may be more powerful than any yet seen, simultaneously involving huge physical climate impacts, deep technological changes, new resource landscapes, unprecedented litigation and liability exposures, and quickly-evolving social norms (e.g. climate strikes, divestment campaigns, hostility to single-use plastics, veganism) that will produce new policies, laws, judicial decisions and employment requirements.

He observed that many of the risks are non-linear and there is a scarcity of backward-looking data with which to appreciate them. Moreover, risk exposures are systemic and permeate the entire economic and financial system – companies, asset managers, asset owners, and regulators. Hence more attention must be paid to all nature-related risks: not just climate, but biodiversity[6] too. In every future scenario there is a lot of risk and many stranded assets, with a range based on global mean temperature rise and the extent, focus and intensity of human responses, and the numbers involved are “scarily big” (e.g. 30-80 trillion dollars of stranded assets for a two degree temperature rise, larger for a 1.5 degree cap as agreed at Paris). All of this had been predicted in the 1980s by Florentin Krause, Wilfrid Bach and Jon Koomey[7].

Ben said that he “tends towards the pessimistic end of the spectrum of options”, and explained a number of constraints on the necessary investments. Optimism bias concerns energy forecasts versus reality. Here the number of years before a ‘tipping point’ at which 100% of energy investment goes into renewables (i.e. when fossil fuels become a sunset industry attracting no investment, and its decline will accelerate) is realistically four years away now, but Exxon-Mobil still assumes 50 years and BP 31 years. Short-termism, the fallacy of sunk costs, and loss aversion together discourage accurate accounting of stranded assets and irrational commitment to vulnerable asset holdings and investments. He then turned to sovereign actors, which are involved because they own assets or enterprises, possess sovereign wealth funds, are vulnerable to the macroeconomic and fiscal implications of changing asset and product values (especially commodity exports), and are affected by the political economy frictions arising from stranded assets (e.g. mass unemployment).

He answered the ‘so what?’ question by saying that stranded assets are relevant to investment, financial stability, corporate strategy, and the issue of ‘just transition’ (i.e. managing the negative impacts on society). He summarised the thinking of the Bank of England as a key central bank and financial supervisor, starting with Sir Mervyn King’s correspondence in 2011-2012, the appointment of task forces in 2015, staff working papers in 2016, establishment of the Network for Greening the Financial System in 2017, key studies in 2018, and culminating in the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) Supervisory Statement to take effect 15 October 2019. This requires, for example, all banking and insurance businesses to appoint people who are responsible and liable for climate risk, to allocate sufficient resources to deal with climate risk, to report transparently and accountably on the management of climate risk, and to provide evidence of compliance. The policy implications are profound. The UK Climate Transition Impacts Assessment provides good and consistent data to support decisions. To overcome loss aversion, much more powerful policy signals are needed. But we need to look beyond disclosure at more active ways to scale up investment in climate resilience. As Ben concluded: “If ever there was an area where it would make sense to take money from the future and spend it now, this is it!”

  • Q1: Has the price of asset stranding been built into pricing? A1: No, because of short-termism and perverse incentives.
  • Q2: Are pensions involved? A2: This is a big problem. 20-25% of all dividend payments in the UK are from BP and Shell.
  • Q3: How to prioritise risks? A3: On the physical risk side: mitigate, adapt, consider the Global Warming Index, which shows that a 1.7 degree rise has already been ‘baked’ into the system. The sooner you change the easier it is to minimise commitments to bad things. Lots of asset stranding will occur, inevitably.
  • Q4: Impact of PRA intervention? A4: This only applies to bankers and insurers; less stringent arrangements apply to pensions, and more work is needed there.
  • Q5: Nuclear? A5: There are no solutions to correct a terrible mistake like Hinkley C.
  • Q6: How pessimistic are you? A6: “I’m a technology optimist, but I don’t think we’ll do enough or work out well enough how to ‘come back down’ [to sustainable levels]. Climate impacts are greater than we thought they would be. There is a policy response, driven by climate strikes, XR, etc., but how much impact are these having in China, India, Brazil? The UK government is doing quite a good job, but other jurisdictions are a real problem.”

Three other speakers followed in ten-minute slots. On energy strategy, Dan Meredith (E.on) said that E.on has been selling off its fossil fuel power stations (“E.on’s job is to make money for its shareholders, so this was a huge gamble”). The energy flow chart for the UK is complex, but right now 36% of power in the national electricity grid is zero carbon. The total energy picture is very different, however, and renewables are tiny relative to gas and petroleum. Energy efficiency is key, but constrained by the very poor quality of UK housing. A just transition is vital, and here the distribution of costs is important. Simply putting the costs on energy bills unfairly impacts the poor (and putting decarbonisation costs only on electricity bills creates a perverse incentive), so general progressive taxation is better. The most economically efficient thing is a high and stable carbon price, but the poor must be protected politically. In any case a whole suite of policies must be used, on a spectrum from more market-based (research & development, subsidies, quotas, trading schemes) to more interventionist (taxation, mandatory phase-outs). There are no ‘silver bullets’ and all policy levers must be used. The reason why the UK has been able to make the progress that it has is due to a cross-party policy consensus that has been sustained for 30 years (1989-2019) – a rare and precious phenomenon.

On ecology strategy, James Bell (Rothamsted) described phenological changes in the UK (i.e. the timing of flowering, fruiting, leafing, insect dispersal, etc.) and noted that food webs are starting to fall apart because of growing trophic mismatches between supply (e.g. of seeds, insects, nectar, young leaves) and demand (e.g. baby birds). There are many other consequences as well, such as wet fields affecting farming activities. Mitigating these changes will require more attention to domestic water collection, meal-worms in garden bird feeders, and drought-resistant crops, as well as active international campaigning, especially at next year’s UNFCCC CoP 26 in Glasgow and during the UNGA-declared UN Decade of Ecosystem Restoration (2021-2030), and participating in the IPCC. He mentioned peatland [necromass] as storing more carbon than all vegetation [biomass] in the world combined, and described the decay and burning of Arctic peatlands as a “positive feedback of nightmare proportions”. Hence there should be protection of forests such as the 67 hectare Heartwood Forest, home composting, asking Parliament to restrict the use of peat-based compost, and research on composting. His final point was that only Morocco is currently on track to comply with all UNFCCC Paris milestones on the 1.5 degree pathway.

On economic strategy, Bim Afolami (MP) observed that in political terms the question is: “how are we going to pay for this stuff?” He noted that the Treasury relies on weak models that misrepresent the costs and benefits of transition. But he expressed optimism over the role of the private sector and green finance, and the potential of the City of London to bring the world together and to facilitate correction of activities in recalcitrant jurisdictions. He observed that some things should be taxed more and others less, that private investors need incentives to be rearranged, and that green finance can be used to bring down the costs of investments in capital-intensive changes (e.g. home insulation). Asked (by XR St Albans) whether he thought that zero carbon by 2050 was immediate enough, he said that “we’ll have to be bolder than we are being even to reach the 2050 target, and there’s no point in declaring an earlier goal until we know that we can reach the current one.”

After magnificent overviews by Baroness Brown and Ben Caldecott, amplified by the other speakers, it seemed clear that the task of the ecology breakout group was to consider how ecology[8] could develop the ecological rules by which government must be guided and held to account. There were some 30 participants in the main auditorium before a panel chaired by James Bell (entomologist, Rothamsted) and flanked by Jo Judge (National Biodiversity Network Trust), Alain Jones (? Environment Agency), Lesley Jones (Hertfordshire Wildlife Trusts) and John Pritchard (River Ver conservation group). Dr Bell said that the aim was to produce three outputs for Bim Afolami to take back to Parliament: a short-term policy aim for national government; a long-term policy aim for national government; and some local priorities.

I thought that the focus should be on how to build ecological principles into governance and a national society that survives the current emergency to live at peace with nature. I therefore proposed the short-term aim of following Scotland in establishing a national Citizens’ Assembly, with an open mandate to consider the future of English social and ecological systems, and the long-term aim of putting its conclusions into effect. (Local priorities would build on declaring climate and ecological emergencies and early zero emission and biodiversity-loss goals, and starting the consultation, participation, planning, regulation and investment processes needed to achieve those goals, including local and regional Citizens Assemblies to guide and support decisions.) In an effort to broaden the group’s attention beyond limiting methane emissions from livestock, I also observed that the most important methane issue was to do with the trillions of tCO2e likely to be released by the melting Arctic in the 2030s, which pose a truly existential threat to the fabric of the biosphere[9].

The chair responded that these were “very good points, but concrete proposals are needed”. He then guided the meeting back to topics that had been dominating the discussion, specifically the need: for more ecologists to be employed by local government; for more public education on biodiversity; for climate-resistant gardening and bird-feeding; for domestic water conservation; for economic resource valuations to include natural systems and inform government planning; for new buildings to have higher standards for energy and water conservation; for joined-up government thinking; for consumer preferences to incentivise farmers to manage land better; for promoting plant-based diets; for more effective recycling of wastes; for roadside verges to be used as wildlife refuges; and for local councils to compost their own green wastes rather than using peat.

These are all perfectly reasonable proposals, of course, but in my view either too generic or too specific to target the strategic challenges posed by the climate and ecological emergency. In any case, there remained six minutes for the chair to distil advice for Parliament, and his final remarks were that short-term objectives would include better regulations for new buildings and the employment of more local government ecologists; local priorities were to focus on composting, less use of peat, and road-side verges; and no long-term objective was specified.

I had to leave the conference then, with the feeling that an opportunity for ecological systems perspectives to influence the strategic agenda had been lost. I think it should have been remembered by the organisers: (a) that ecology is the only science that deals with complex living systems at all interconnected scales, including all parts of a planetary ecosystem that is now in total crisis; and (b) that science-based ecological thinking is the key to both understanding and resolving the climate and ecological emergency. From this point of view, the ‘ecology’ part of the conference was an alarming disappointment.

© Julian Caldecott (Schumacher Institute for Sustainable Systems)

Notes

[1] Climate Strike: www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/21/across-the-globe-millions-join-biggest-climate-protest-ever

[2] UK climate progress and priorities: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/20/the-guardian-view-on-transport-emissions-the-trouble-with-planes-and-automobiles

[3] Cathedral Thinking: No One is Too Small to Make a Difference by Greta Thunberg, Penguin, London, 2019:45-54.

[4] Creative destruction: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942.

[5] Techno-economic paradigm shifts: Microelectronics, Long Waves and World Structural Change: New Perspectives for Developing Countries’, World Development, 13:441-463, 1985.

[6] Biodiversity. The variety and variation among all kinds of life, or the information that has accumulated in living systems, including the genetic coding for proteins, metabolic pathways, cells and individual organisms, the differences among lineages and species, and the relationships and processes in every ecosystem.

[7] Risks of transition: From Warming Fate to Warming Limit: benchmarks for a global climate convention, International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths, 1989.

[8] Ecology. (1) The science of living systems, including our own selves, families, communities, farms and dwellings, as well as the atmosphere, oceans, coasts, swamps, grasslands, soils, drylands and forests and all their non-human inhabitants, which make up the living world and every part of it. The systems approach requires an ecologist to consider all potential connections between systems, and to think in terms of every system being part of a bigger one, from the molecular to the global level, and with the characteristics of every level both influenced by and influencing every other level. (2) The study of how organisms live together, meet their needs for energy and nutrients, and respond to their environment. As a science, it relies on the use of common standards of observation, analysis and collective criticism to build up reliable descriptions and explanations of reality; and as biology, it assumes the engineering of organisms through evolutionary responses to design challenges imposed and opportunities offered by the real world.

[9] Biosphere. (1) All parts of the Earth where life occurs, comprising the atmosphere, all oceans, fresh waters, soils and land surfaces, and their underlying sediments and shallow rock layers. The total depth of the biosphere is about 30 km, from high altitude to depths underground that are too hot for organisms to survive. (2) The planetary ecosystem and its emergent properties, comprising all lesser ecosystems and all their connections, and sometimes called Gaia.